

13 May 1986

MEMORANDUM FOR:

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VC/CIPC

SUBJECT: Results of Inaugural Meeting of the Force Multiplier Group
9 May 1986

1. As I reported at this morning's CIPC staff meeting, there is a need to decide between two approaches for the multiplier study:

- The development of "measures of merit" ("qualitative measurables," in the words of the NSA representative--see attached summary of the working group meeting) that can be applied in the process of making decisions about whether to acquire intelligence capabilities instead of additional military equipments and units.

OR

- The presentation of how the NFIP supports the military for a range of missions and activities in peace and war en route to developing recommendations for dealing with gaps, shortfalls, what have you.

2. I am inclined to go with the second approach for a lot of reasons that we can discuss at your convenience. Whatever approach ultimately is taken, I think it needs top-level blessing as I have mentioned in the past.

3. FYI, in my introductory remarks at the meeting I quoted from the DCI's National Foreign Intelligence Strategy and from the DCI's Guidance for the formulation of the FY 1988-1992 NFIP that "our greatest problem areas" are likely to include, and "particular emphasis will be placed on" providing direct intelligence support to operational military forces.

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Intelligence as a Force Multiplier: NFIP Support to US Military ForcesSummary Comments of the Representatives
(Meeting of 9 May 1986)

CIA [] There were two "concerns" to air at the outset of the study: first, operators in the field need to be made aware of the results of the study otherwise they will continue to ask the perennial questions, "how can the resources of intelligence be tapped," and "how can intelligence help me?" Second, intelligence producers sometimes operate in a vacuum and they aren't always attuned to the needs of the military. A better way needs to be found to make the producers aware of the military's needs.

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DIA [] The study is "doable" within the time allotted. The TOR need to be more explicit about the level of analysis ("micro v. macro"), the collection systems to be covered, and kind and level of military operations envisioned for the war fighting portion of the study. Most of the work already has been done for the first three sections. For example, the D-WIP (Chapter 3) covers intelligence capabilities, both strategic and tactical, in a very detailed way. The trick will be to identify "shortfalls" and then turn these over to the program managers for a determination of the feasibility of proposed fixes and of resource availability. Above all, the study should avoid using scenarios (e.g., the air/land battle, maritime battle, etc.) because they are extremely difficult to generate (a "massive effort") and seldom agreed within the DoD.

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NSA [] For the study to be as effective as possible, "qualitative measurables" need to be developed. These would enable the evaluation of choices between particular pieces of intelligence or intelligence programs in competition with, say, additional military units. Without such "measurables," attempts to justify intelligence resources are bound to be futile, and therefore any other kind of study is not likely to demonstrate that the NFIP is a force multiplier.

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Air Force (Richard O'Neil). The proposed study seems to "tread on the toes" of the TENCAP organizations--the latter are intended to exploit NFIP resources for the benefit of operational commanders. While the Community's intelligence organizations are represented on the working group, the CINCs are not. (The DIA representative commented that she would be representing their interests.) There also was a question of whether or not NFIP support to the NATO and other allies should be within the purview of the study.

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HUMINT Committee [] The best approach for the study is to build on the existing intelligence base. Beyond this consideration, an NFIP budgeteer needs to be present for the group's deliberations. There needs to be a better focus on what the study is supposed to achieve whether it be more resources or "cures" for continuing problems.

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Navy (Robert Vosilus). If the target audiences of the study are the military services, a scramble for resources is unavoidable. If the goal is to be able to say that intelligence is worth more than say, another division, then the challenge will be to determine what would it take to make the NFIP a real force multiplier.

Notes: The Marine Corps, Army, and ASD/C³I representatives did not attend the meeting. State/INR has not yet identified a representative to serve on the group. [] briefed the group on the study of NFIP Support to Contingency Operations.

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